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BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH: RESEARCH
ON THE FETUS
DISSENTING

STATEMENT

COMMISSIONER DAVID W.

OF

LOUISELLt

I am compelled to disagree with the Commission's Recommendations (and the reasoning and definitions on which they are based)
insofar as they succumb to the error of sacrificing the interests of innocent human life to a postulated social need. I fear this is the inevitable
result of Recommendations (5) and (6). These would permit nontherapeutic research on the fetus in anticipation of abortion and during
the abortion procedure, and on a living infant after abortion when the
infant is considered nonviable, even though such research is precluded
by recognized norms governing human research in general. Although
the Commission uses adroit language to minimize the appearance of
violating standard norms, no facile verbal formula can avoid the reality
that under these Recommendations the fetus and nonviable infant will
be subjected to nontherapeutic research from which other humans are
protected.
I disagree with regret, not only because of the Commission's
zealous efforts but also because there is significant good in its Report
especially its showing that much of the research in this area is therapeutic for the individuals involved, both born and unborn, and hence of
unquestioned morality when based on prudent medical judgment. The
Report also makes clear that some research, even though nontherapeutic,
is merely observational or otherwise without significant risk to the
subject, and therefore is within standard human research norms and as
unexceptional morally as it is useful scientifically.
But the good in much of the Report cannot blind me to its departure
from our society's most basic moral commitment: the essential equality
of all human beings. For me the lessons of history are too poignant,
and those of this century too fresh, to ignore another violation of human
integrity and autonomy by subjecting unconsenting human beings,
whether or not viable, to harmful research even for laudable scientific
purposes.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court's rationale in its abortion decisions
of 1973 - Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, 310 U.S. 113, 179 t Elizabeth Josselyn Boalt Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
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has given this Commission an all but impossible task. For many see
in that rationale a total negation of fetal rights, absolutely so for the
first two trimesters and substantially so for the third. The confusion
is understandable, rooted as it is in the Court's invocation of the specially constructed legal fiction of "potential" human life, its acceptance
of the notion that human life must be "meaningful" in order to be
deserving of legal protection, and its resuscitation of the concept of
partial human personhood, . which had been thought dead in American
society since the demise of the.Dredd Scott decision. Little wonder that
intelligent people are asking: how can one who has no right to life
itself have the lesser right of precluding experimentation on his or her
person ?

It seems to me that there are at least two compelling answers to
the notion that Roe and Doe have placed fetal experimentation, and
experimentation on noviable infants,, altogether outside the established
protections for human, experimentation. First, while we must abide
the Court's mandate in.a particular case on the issues actually decided
even though the decision is wrong and in fact only an exercise of "raw
judicial power" (White, J., dissenting in Roe and Doe), this does not
mean we should extend an erroneous rationale to other situations. To
the contrary, while seeking to have the wrong corrected by the Court
itself, or by the public, the citizen should resist its extension to other
contexts. As Abraham. Lincoln, discussing the Dredd.Scott decision,
put it:

"(T)he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant that
they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties in personal
actions, the people 'will have ceased to be their own rulers, having,
to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands
of that eminent tribunal." (4 Basler, The Collected Works of
Abraham Lincoln, 262, 268 (1963).)
Thus even if the Court had intended by its Roe 'and Doe rationale to
exclude the unborn, and newly born. nonviable infants, from all legal
protection including that against harmful experimentation, I can see
no legal principle which would justify, let alone require, passive submission to such a breach of our moral tradition and commitment.
Secondly, the Court in Roe 'and Doe did not have before it, and
presumably did not intend to pass upon and did not in fact pass upon,
the question of experimentation on the fetus or born infant. Certainly
that question was not directly involved in those cases. Granting the
fullest intendment to those decisions possibly arguable, it seems to me
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that the woman's new-found constitutional right of privacy is fulfilled
upon having the fetus aborted. If an infant survives the abortion, there
is hardly an additional right of privacy to then have him or her killed
or harmed in any way, including harm by experimentation impermissible
under standard norms. At least Roe and Doe should not be assumed
to recognize such a right. And while the Court's unfortunate language
respecting "potential" and "meaningful" life is thought by some to
imply a total abandonment of in utero life for all legal purposes, at least
for the first two trimesters, such a conclusion would so starkly confront
our social, legal, and moral traditions that I think we should not
assume it. To the contrary we should assume that the language was
limited by the abortion context in which used and was not intended to
effect a departure from the limits on human experimentation universally
recognized at least in principle.
A shorthand way, developed during the Commission's deliberations, of stating the principle that would adhere to recognized human
experimentation norms and that should be recommended in place of
Recommendation (5) is: No research should be permitted on a fetusto-be-aborted that would not be permitted on one to go to term. This
principle is essential if all of the unborn are to have the protection of
recognized limits on human experimentation. Any lesser protection
violates the automony and integrity of the fetus, and even a decision
to have an abortion cannot justify ignoring this fact. There is not only
the practical problem of a possible change of mind by the pregnant
woman. For me, the chief vice of Recommendation (5) is that it
permits an escape hatch from human experimentation principles merely
by decision of a national ethical review body. No principled basis for
an exception has been, nor in my judgment can be, formulated. The
argument that the fetus-to-be-aborted "will die anyway" proves too
much. All of us "will die anyway." A woman's decision to have an
abortion, however protected by Roe and Doe in the interests of her
privacy or freedom of her own body, does not change the nature or
quality of fetal life.
Recommendation (6) concerns what is now called the "nonviable
fetus ex utero" but which up to now has been known by the law, and I
think by society generally, as an infant, however premature. This
Recommendation is unacceptable to me because, on approval of a national review body, it makes certain infants up to five months gestational
age potential research material, provided the mother who has of course
consented to the abortion, also consents to the experimentation and the
father has not objected. In my judgment all infants, however premature
or inevitable their death, are within the norms governing human experi-
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mentation generally. We do not subject the aged dying to unconsented
experimentation, nor should we the youthful dying.
Both Recommendations (5) and (6) have the additional vice of
giving the researcher a vested interest in the actual effectuation of a
particular abortion, and society a vested interest in permissive abortion
in general.
I would, therefore, turn aside any approval, even in science's name,
that would by euphemism or other verbal device, subject any unconsenting human being, born or unborn, to harmful research, even that intended to be good for society. Scientific purposes might be served by
nontherapeutic research on retarded children, or brain dissection of the
old who have ceased to lead "meaningful" lives, but such research is
not proposed - at least not yet. As George Bernard Shaw put it in
The Doctor's Dilemma: "No man is allowed to put his mother in the
stove because he desires to know how long an adult woman will survive
the temperature of 500 degrees Fahrenheit, no matter how important or
interesting that particular addition to the store of human knowledge
may be." Is it the mere youth of the fetus that is thought to foreclose
the full protection of established human experimentation norms? Such
reasoning would imply that a child is less deserving of protection than
an adult. But reason, our tradition, and the U.N. Declaration of Human
Rights all speak to the contrary, emphasizing the need of special protection for the young.
Even if I were to approach my task as a Commissioner from a
utilitarian viewpoint only, I would have to say that on the record here
I am not convinced that an adequate showing has been made of the
necessity for nontherapeutic fetal experimentation in the scientific or
social interest. The Commission's reliance is on the Battelle Report and
its reliance is misplaced. The relevant Congressional mandate was to
conduct an investigation and study of the alternative means for achieving the purposes of fetal research (P.L. 93-348, July 12, 1974, Sec.
202 (b) ; National Research Act).
As Commissioner Robert E. Cooke, M.D., who is sophisticated in
research procedures, pointed out in his Critique of the Battelle Report:
"The only true objective approach beyond question, since scientists
make [the analysis of the necessity for nontherapeutic fetal research],
is to collect information and analyze past research accomplishments
with the intention of disproving, not proving the hypothesis that research utilizing the living human fetus nonbeneficially is necessary."
The Battelle Report seems to me not in accord with the Congressional
intention in that it proceeds from -a viewpoint opposite to that quoted,
and is really an effort to prove the indispensability of nontherapeutic
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research. In any event, if that is its purpose, it fails to achieve it, for
most of what it claims to have been necessary could be justified as
therapeutic research or at least as noninvasive of the fetus (e.g., probably amniocentesis). In view of the haste with which this statement must
be prepared if it is to accompany the Commission's Report, rather than
enlarge upon these views now I refer both to the Cooke Critique and
the Battelle Report itself both of which I am informed will be a part of
or appended to the Commission's Report.
An emotional plea was made at the Commission's hearings not to
acknowledge limitations on experimentation that would inhibit the
court-granted permissive abortion. However, until its last meeting, I
think the Commission for the most part admirably resisted the temptation to distort its purpose by pro-abortion advocacy. But at the last
meeting, without prior preparation or discussion, it adopted Recommendation (12) promotive of research on abortion techniques. This
I feel is not germane to our task, is imprudent and certainly was not
adequately considered.
Finally, I do not think that the Commission should urge lifting
the moratorium on fetal research as stated in Recommendation (16).
To the extent that duration of the moratorium is controlled by Section
213 of the National Research Act, the subject is beyond our control
and we ought not assume authority that is not ours. This is matter not
for us and not, ultimately, for any administrative official, but for Congress. If the American people as a democratic society really intend to
withdraw from the fetus and nonviable infant the protection of the
established principles governing human experimentation, that action I
feel should come from the Congress of the United States, in the absence
of a practical way to have a national vote. Assuming that any representative voice is adequate to bespeak so basic and drastic a change in
the public philosophy of the United States, it could only be the voice
of Congress. Of course there is no reason why the Secretary of DHEW
cannot immediately make clear that no researcher need stand in fear
of therapeutic research.
As noted at the outset, the Commission's work has achieved some
good results in reducing the possibilities of manifest abuses and thereby
according a measure of protection to humans at risk by reason of research. That it has not been more successful is in my judgment not due
so much to the Commission's failings as to the harsh and pervasive
reality that American society is itself at risk - the risk of losing its
dedication "to the proposition that all men are created equal." We may
have to learn once again that when the bell tolls for the lost rights of
any human being, even the politically weakest, it tolls for all.
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